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The missing wage rigidity in general equilibrium models of e±ciency
wages is an artifact of the external wage reference perspective conven-
tionally adopted by the literature. E±ciency wage models based on an
internal perspective, in which the wage reference is made dependent on
the ¯rm's ability to pay, are capable of generating strong wage rigidity.
This paper makes the point in the context of the gift-exchange framework
originally proposed by Akerlof [1982].
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11 Introduction
Why don't ¯rms lower wages in the face of depressed labor demand conditions?
The e±ciency wage theory was initially meant as the answer to that very ques-
tion.1 Recent developments have, however, put in doubt the ability of this
theory to generate signi¯cant wage rigidity. In this note, we show that the e±-
ciency wage hypothesis by itself implies neither wage rigidity nor a lack thereof.
Wage rigidity rather depends on the interpretation of the reference wage level
to which workers compare their salary when deciding on work e®ort. As long as
this reference wage stays relatively constant, ¯rms avoid large wage reductions
following negative labor demand shifts because the thus realized cost savings
would be more than o®set by the resulting decrease in labor productivity.
Conventional formulations of the e±ciency wage theory, such as Shapiro
and Stiglitz' [1984] shirking model, Salop's [1979] labor turnover model, but
also Akerlof's [1982] partial gift exchange model interpret the reference wage as
external to the ¯rm, based on the assumption that workers appraise their wage
in light of the remuneration they could obtain if they were not under contract
with their current employer. As we show in the present note, these models
fail to generate wage rigidity in general equilibrium. We also demonstrate,
however, that if the reference wage is made dependent on ¯rm-internal measures
of earnings per unit of labor { i.e. if what workers care for is the division of
the rent with capital owners { the same e±ciency wage model is capable of
delivering strong wage rigidity in general equilibrium.
The intuition behind the di®erence in results is simple. In the external per-
spective, the wage reference of workers is positively related to outside earnings
opportunities and the latter are sensitive to aggregate shocks. For example,
when ¯rms reduce employment in response to a labor demand shift, there is
a general equilibrium fall of the wage reference, permitting individual ¯rms to
lower their wages and leading to a further decrease in the reference wage. All in
all, it is possible for ¯rms to lower wages without severe consequences on e®ort.
Put graphically, the ¯rm's wage setting curve in general equilibrium implies a
steep positive relationship between employment and wages. By contrast, in the
internal reference case and under the assumption that the marginal productivity
of labor is decreasing, a reduction in the ¯rm's payroll due to a labor demand
shift increases earnings per unit of labor and thus the wage reference. Opti-
mizing along the e®ort dimension therefore results in ¯rms operating along a
negatively sloped wage setting curve.2
Akerlof and Yellen [1990] also adopt an internal reference perspective when
they examine the implications of a model where workers with di®erent skills
compare their wage to the wage of co-workers in the same ¯rm when deciding
on e®ort. They ¯nd that such a model has the potential to explain the intra-
1See Yellen [1984] for a survey.
2Furthermore, shocks to productivity not only shift the labor demand curve (as is the case
in the external reference case) but also the wage setting curve. This shift neutralizes (part
of) the wage °uctuation and implies that aggregate shocks potentially have a strong e®ect on
employment while leaving real wages and productivity largely unchanged.
2industry wage di®erentials observed in the data. Other formulations of e±ciency
wage have been proposed to remedy the failure of existing external reference
models to deliver wage rigidity. Collard and De la Croix [2000] and an earlier
study by the present authors (Danthine and Kurmann [2004]) extend Akerlof's
original reduced-form e®ort function to include the workers past wage in the
reference wage. Their simulations show that as long as this intertemporal wage
link plays an important role, the model is capable of generating strong wage
rigidity.
2 Internal vs. External Wage References
Consider an economy with identical workers and identical ¯rms. Firms use
e®ective labor en to produce output y as per
y = f(en) = A(en)®; 0 < ® < 1 (1)
where ® is a constant, A stands for the level of the technology, n is the level
of labor input and e stands for work e®ort which cannot be observed directly.
Despite e®ort being costly to them (in terms of utility), workers are assumed to
volunteer e®ort according to





; 0 < ° < 1; (2)
with a0;a1 and ° positive constants. In this relation, identi¯ed as the E®ort
Condition (EC), w denotes the workers' real wage per unit of labor while wr
stands for the reference wage in light of which workers evaluate their compensa-
tion. The larger the premium of w over wr, the more the representative worker
is willing to provide e®ort.
This EC subsumes various alternative versions of the e±ciency wage story.
In his seminal paper, Akerlof [1982] motivated it as the result of reciprocity:
the exchange between workers and ¯rms of a gift of e®ort against a gift of a
remuneration over and above the wage reference.3 The same condition could
also be viewed as the reduced-form consequence of the shirking model of Shapiro
and Stiglitz [1984] or of the turnover model of Salop [1979]. In both cases a real
wage in excess of the reference wage is what induces the worker to provide e®ort,
because being ¯red, respectively quitting, is thus made costly to him/her.
What should the reference wage wr be? In the shirking and the turnover
stories, but also in the gift exchange view proposed by Akerlof, the perspective
is decidedly external. That is, workers compare their salary to the compensation
they could expect to receive were they not employed with their current ¯rm.
Thus, wr depends on the wage workers would obtain if rehired by another
(identical) ¯rm, ¹ w, on the probability of reemployment after leaving the ¯rm,
which we identify as the aggregate level of employment ¹ n (with full employment
3Bewley (1999) considers the reciprocity view to be the most plausibly in line with the
acknowledged behavior of the more than 300 US managers questioned in his survey.
3being normalized at 1), and on the level of unemployment bene¯ts the worker
obtains if he is not re-hired, which we denote b. We adopt the functional form
proposed by Akerlof who writes the reference wage as a geometric average of
the above components :
wr = ¹ w¹ nb1¡¹ n: (3)
There is, however, an alternative approach, at least in the gift exchange
perspective, one that places the issue of rent sharing between ¯rms and workers
at the center of attention. In this internal reference view, workers appreciate
their salary o®er in light of the ¯rm's output per employee, y=n, and of their
reservation wage b. The former represents the maximum wage at which the
entire rent is attributed to the worker, the latter the minimum one below which
the worker would rather stay home (and collect unemployment compensations).4
The closer the actual w is to the most generous wage o®er, the more workers are
ready to volunteer e®ort; conversely a wage o®er close to the worker's reservation
wage, at which most of the rent goes to the ¯rm, elicit a lower e®ort level.
In the spirit of the Akerlof functional form adopted as a representation of






where º is some arbitrary constant between 0 and 1.
Equations (2) and (3) or (4) are part of ¯rms' information set. That is, ¯rms
understand what makes workers volunteer e®ort and they choose labor n and
the salary w in order to maximize pro¯t A(en)® ¡wn subject to the alternative
set of constraints ((2), and either (3) or (4)).5














Equation (5) is the labor demand function. Equation (6) is the so-called Solow
(1979) condition resulting from combining the labor demand with the ¯rst-order
condition with respect to wages. Combining the EC with this SC implies that
the optimal wage (from the perspective of the employer) is a constant markup










4Alternatively, we could have assumed the existence of a mandated minimum wage. As
long as this minimum is taken as given by the ¯rm, however, the conclusions reached below
remain unchanged.
5This statement only applies if total labor supply at the optimal wage is in excess of total






In the internal reference case, equations (5) and (6) take a slightly di®erent
form because the ¯rm takes account of the consequences of changes in n on the




(1 + "e;n) (9)
1 = "e;w ¡ "e;n.
We label the latter expression the Modi¯ed Solow Condition (MSC). It di®ers
from (6) because, with an internal reference, a marginal wage increase has an
additional e®ect on e®ort resulting from the fact that the induced decrease in
employment has itself a (negative) impact on e®ort. Thus, ceteris paribus, the
last wage increase warranted in the external reference case would not pay for
itself in the internal reference context. The fact that the traditional Solow condi-
tion, universally associated with the e±ciency wages hypothesis, no longer holds
in the internal reference case underlines the ubiquity of the external reference
perspective in the literature.6










from which one derives
e =
°a0(1 ¡ º)
1 ¡ °(1 ¡ º)
. (11)
The formal similarity between the two perspectives is evident. In both cases,
given the selected functional forms, it is optimal to set the wage at a constant
premium over the reference wage and this implies that optimal e®ort is constant
in the sense of being unrelated to the equilibrium level of endogenous variables.
Moreover, in the external as well as the internal reference, as long as wr
belongs to the "ceteris paribus" { i.e. in a partial equilibrium context { the
e±ciency wage model generates strong wage rigidity. This is the argument made
by Yellen [1984], among others. The crucial di®erence arises once attention is
paid to the fact that in general equilibrium, the reference wage wr is itself an
endogenous variable and it may be strongly a®ected by external shocks. This
is indeed the case in the external (but not the internal) perspective in which
the only reason for ¯rms to hold their wages constant is if all other ¯rms keep
theirs constant. But even if they were to do so, the decrease in employment
6Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) is a rare reference discussing situations where the
Solow condition fails to hold. They mention the case of a more complex production function
and another one that combines wage bargaining with e±ciency wage considerations. These
authors also brie°y mention the possibility that the workers' goodwill could be in°uenced by
the ¯rm's ability to pay. They do not explore the implications of that hypothesis, however.
5that follows a negative shock, in and of itself, decreases the wage reference. The
result is that ¯rms ¯nd it optimal to decrease their own wage and as all of them
are in the same situation, nothing prevents both the wage o®ers and the wage
reference from adjusting °exibly. Thus once imbedded in a general equilibrium
model, the external reference e±ciency wage model fails to generate sluggish
wage movements, a point made early on by Danthine and Donaldson [1990] in
a real business cycle context.
Pursuing this reasoning more formally, let us observe that with homogenous
¯rms and workers, equilibrium implies ¹ w = w and ¹ n = n. Hence, the wage
setting curve (7) becomes
















(logw ¡ logb) =
¡n
1 ¡ n
log½ > 0. (13)
The second equality is obtained under the plausible assumption that unem-
ployment bene¯ts in equilibrium are a fraction of the salary; i.e. b = ½w with
0 < ½ < 1 being de¯ned as the replacement ratio. This substitution permits ex-
pressing the elasticity independently from the parameters of the e®ort function
(a0;a1;°), or from other structural parameters (®, A).
Given that unemployment is between 5% and 10% in most industrialized
economies and the replacement ratios vary between 0:35 and 0:65, the external
reference model implies the following measures of wage rigidity7
½ = 0:35 ½ = 0:65
n = 0:9 9:45 3:88
n = 0:95 19:95 8:19
Even in the "most favorable" scenario (n = 0:9 and ½ = 0:65), labor demand
shifts impact wages almost four times as much as employment.
By contrast, there is no di®erence in the internal reference case between
the wage setting curve for the ¯rm and the corresponding general equilibrium
relation as the wage reference is a function of ¯rm-internal measures and not of
economy-wide aggregates. We use the solution for optimal e®ort and the fact















®°º. Imposing again that b = ½w
in equilibrium, the elasticity of w with respect to n along the wage setting curve
7This elasticity measure would not be constant over the cycle as n and b=w vary. Rather,






= (® ¡ 1) < 0. (15)
Since ® is commonly set around 0:6 to 0:7, the internal reference elasticity
(15) is negative but small in size. Moreover, changes in employment brought
about by labor demand shifts may also shift the wage setting curve. In particu-
lar, if labor demand increases because of a positive productivity shock to A, the
wage setting curve shifts up and thus neutralizes (some of the) negative impact
on wages.
3 Conclusions
This note has showed that the gift-exchange version of the e±ciency wage model
is capable of generating strong wage rigidity in general equilibrium provided the
reference wage is viewed as an internal reference rather than (or in addition
to) the external reference proposed by Akerlof in his original contribution and
generally adopted by the ensuing literature.
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